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THE MEANS

OF OBTAINING IMMEDIATE PEACE;

ADDRESSED TO

THE KING AND PEOPLE

OF

Great-Britain.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY JOHN SKILL.

LONDON:

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THE following pages were first printed in London in the French language, in the month of July, 1794; *but the publication was suppressed. It would be unnecessary, and might perhaps appear invidious, to state by whom, as the intelligent Reader will readily discover who were the parties most likely to feel themselves interested in the suppression of a liberal discussion on that important subject,* The Means of obtaining Peace.

A copy having accidentally fallen into the hands of the Editor, he thought it his duty to give the Public this Translation, to counteract, as much as possible, the intrigues of those interested beings, who would withhold from them that information which well-intentioned men were desirous to afford them.

The Editor thinks this would be a sufficient apology for presenting the work at this period, even were not the necessity for any so considerably lessened, by the very masterly manner in which it has been performed; and he has only to request the Reader will bear in mind the time when, and the circumstances under which it was written, as he has not thought it necessary to load the page with notes, respecting the various transactions to which it refers.

LONDON, August 3, 1795.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE

MEANS

OF OBTAINING

IMMEDIATE PEACE.

REASON, perhaps, will not be liſtened to by men with arms in their hands, or by thoſe who are in the heat of battle; for in that moment they are only occupied in giving or parrying blows. The mind no longer acts, but the deciſion of their difference is committed to ſtrength alone. I conſider it is not with nations, as with individuals: when thoſe make War, they are not poſſeſſed of that rage which agitates and blinds the contending parties in private combat; and although even that part of the Nation, who fight, ſhould be animated with thoſe violent ſenſations, there always remain at home the greater party, who, deprived of the ſuccour and induſtry of their abſent fellow-citizens, know only the exiſtence of war from the

calamities it brings, without even ſeeing the enemy. One whole Nation, therefore, cannot be animated with ſo rooted an hatred to another, as to ſhut its eyes to the means that may bring about a Peace. I do not even think, that the Chiefs of Nations, although the ſole authors of War, are ſo far blinded with rage and violence, as to ruſh upon each other with the ſword, if they ſhould by chance be brought together: on the contrary, the ſentiments of Nations, like thoſe of their Chiefs, remain always tranquil to a certain degree, in a quarrel which does not regard them perſonally, and their minds remain open to conviction, in any truth relative to the conteſt, even at the moment of its greateſt height.

It is for that reaſon that I determined to ſearch what are the means that remain to re-eſtabliſh Peace between England and France, on a baſis equally honourable to each party; and I have ſome reaſon to believe this diſcuſſion will be well received by the Public. Independent of the conſideration that Peace is pleaſing in itſelf, and dear to all men, I obſerve, that, ſince the opening of this campaign, the unpopularity of the War gains ground daily, and this in a very viſible manner. In England, we no longer hear War againſt France ſpoken of as formerly: few people blame it openly, leſt they ſhould be conſidered as diſaffected, nor praiſe it, becauſe they cannot do it on juſt grounds. For it is to be obſerved, that the ſervility of the Engliſh is not arrived at ſuch a pitch,

that

that they praiſe with their mouths, what they deteſt in their hearts; or that the whole Nation ſpeaks contrary to its ſentiments, to pleaſe thoſe who govern it. Yet but little is ſaid againſt it, almoſt the whole of their diſapprobation conſiſting in a profound ſilence, which unfortunately may be conſidered as the commencement of their own ſlavery. Some talk of the War as indiſpenſably neceſſary, becauſe they do not ſee the means to finiſh it honourably, and becauſe they ſee no *reſource after defeat, but abſolute ruin*; ſome boaſt that this War is glorious, and advantageous to the Nation: but thoſe who inſult the public opinion ſo groſsly, are not to be found even in the army, who carry it on, for their natural character is ſincerity; they are to be found only in the antichambers of Miniſters, whoſe creatures and dependants vociferate its praiſe, in order to endear themſelves to their maſters.

There is no place more proper for a diſcuſſion of this ſort, than England; and it is in London that the moſt important part of the Britiſh people reſide. It is England who, in this War, is at the head of all the Belligerent Powers, and directs them in ſuch a manner, that, if ſhe made Peace, ſhe would give Peace to all Europe: this is an aſſertion that has often been made, without being accompanied with ſufficient proof; it is for that reaſon I ſhall adduce facts, after the expoſition of which, I think, no perſon can have the leaſt doubt on the ſubject.

Every Power ſo evidently regards this War, as the War of England only, that not one of them would either have entered in it, or would now continue it, unleſs they were to be paid by England, notwithſtanding, in all their diplomatic papers, each talks only of the *common cauſe* and *common enemy*.

Let us examine the point.—Ruſſia, after having laſt year promiſed the Cabinet of London twelve thouſand men to invade France, has ſince, by a memorial, written in a ſtyle of deriſion, ſtated in plain terms, that the Britiſh Miniſters might well ſuppoſe that the promiſe was not made ſincerely, ſeeing that even the ſtipulated number of troops was not furniſhed, purſuant to the treaty exiſting between the Courts of Vienna and Peterſburgh; and when, at a ſubſequent period, Mr. Whitworth returned to his miſſion, the Empreſs declared, that ſhe could not furniſh the 12,000 men, unleſs a ſuitable ſubſidy ſhould be granted. This propoſition was not accepted; but it clearly ſhews, that the Empreſs was not diſpoſed to carry on an Engliſh War, unleſs *paid for it* by England.

The King of Pruſſia has no motive to continue a War which is foreign to him, unleſs the Allies pay the expence. The Emperor, the Empire, England and Holland, were to contribute a certain proportion of expence, according to a calculation of the intereſt each party has in the War: all the world knows that the iſſue of the negociation was, *that England ſhould pay the* WHOLE, *except a* SMALL

SHAR

SHARE *to be paid by Holland, which was to be* GUARANTEED *by England.*

England pays to the King of Sardinia 200,000l. ſterling per year, to defend his *own State*, and to make war againſt France. She ought therefore ſhortly to expect, or it has been already inſinuated to her, that *a demand of a ſubſidy on the part of* AUSTRIA *will be made*, that Power having proved, during the negociation that took place relative to the quantum of ſubſidy to the King of Pruſſia, the extreme poverty ſhe was reduced to by her war againſt Turkey, that of the Low Countries, the armaments againſt Pruſſia (which the Peace of Reichenback put an end to), and by two ruinous campaigns againſt France.

There is no doubt but the demand will be complied with: the intimacy that ſubſiſts between the Courts of London and Vienna, the firſt deſirous of detaching the latter at any rate from an alliance with Pruſſia, that one may be formed with herſelf, will not refuſe a ſubſidy, on which, perhaps, her own preſervation depends: this intimacy being ſo great, there is reaſon to believe the outline of a treaty of alliance has already been drawn out. On the other ſide, if England refuſes the ſubſidy, without which it is impoſſible for the Court of Vienna to continue the War, this Court will menace her with abandoning Flanders (a menace which has already been employed with conſiderable effect, and which will compel England to accede to almoſt any thing,

rather

rather than hazard the loſs of this bulwark of Holland againſt France), and which will perhaps realiſe her favourite project of exchanging Bavaria.

What I advance here, is not upon ſimple conjecture; it is at leaſt warranted by the following facts. When General Mack was in London, the laſt time, the negociation for the ſubſidiary troops of Pruſſia was at its height, and Mr. de Mack dropped a hint, that his Maſter would furniſh troops *for a reaſonable ſubſidy*: there has ſince been *weighty* reaſon to recollect a propoſition, which was only then lightly mentioned; for an official communication, to this effect, has been recently made to the Cabinet of St. James's, on the part of his Imperial Majeſty, ſtating in ſubſtance, that the Emperor foreſaw the impoſſibility of continuing the War with vigour againſt France; and that it was neceſſary, for that purpoſe, to have a greater number of men, and other means than thoſe of which he had the diſpoſal.

The Proclamation of May 26 may be conſidered as a proof of this: at preſent there is even a talk of Peace between France and the Emperor, which appears little likely in reality; but what appears more probable is, that this report is circulated with a view to render the approaching demand of a ſubſidy the leſs extraordinary, as well as to procure it with the greater eaſe. For this loan, of which the ſecurity becomes every day more

more precarious, promiſes little, and will not be ſufficient for the purpoſe.

Spain, Naples, and Holland, entered into the War, and continued it, at the ſolicitation, or in fear, of England: in ſhort, an inconteſtable proof that this War is ſolely the War of England, is the multiplicity of her treaties and conventions with all the Belligerent Powers, and the perpetual clauſe that they ſhall not lay down their arms until ſhe ſhall conſent.

I omit noticingall the efforts that have been employed, and all the violence committed, to force the Neutral Powers to War againſt France, (as well thoſe of the North, as thoſe of Italy) by England; who has, on all occaſions, ſhewn herſelf the moſt implacable of all the combined Powers.

If we add to what I have ſaid, the great exertions that England has made on her own account; by the Elector of Hanover; the Landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel; hired troops bargained for at Munich; a body of 4000 men demanded, with a a ſubſidy to the Duke of Brunſwick, but refuſed, at the preſſing ſolicitation of the inhabitants of the country; the crowds of regiments raiſed and commanded by private individuals in Germany and England; the emigrants armed; almoſt all the youth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ſent to the Low Countries, or enrolling to be ſent; private regiments raiſing in the maritime counties for the defence of the interior; beſides two for-

midable fleets—if we combine, I ſay, with the facts I have already related, all theſe efforts, which appear to our imagination like a Nation riſen in maſs, two things will reſult; the one, that all the Powers on the Continent, who continue the War, are ſupported by England only; and the other, that this diſpoſition to domineer, *(jouer le rôle d'Agamemnon)* muſt in a ſhort time exhauſt and ruin England herſelf.

It will appear, by what remains for me to ſtate, that the Powers of Europe have not been wrong in conſidering this War as ſolely the War of England: it is very well known, that the Cabinet of St. James's provoked, by every means, the declaration of War which France made, and that ſhe put that Nation in the ſituation not to be able to recede; the treatment to M. de Chauvelin, and the ignominious diſmiſſal of that Miniſter, furniſh a demonſtrative proof of this.

Before this epoch, and a little after the battle of Jemappe, it was England who gave the alarm, and ſounded the tocſin againſt France, in every part of Europe. In a memorial of November 13, ſhe repreſented theſe new Republicans as conquerors of the moſt dangerous kind, who, with the ſword in one hand, and the "Rights of Man" in the other, would overturn every THRONE. She conjured the Powers to reunite againſt thoſe whom ſhe ſtyled the enemies of order, religion, and commerce, as well as of every civilized State, and laid then the foundation of that league, the

origin

origin of which has erroneouſly been attributed to the Conventions of Pilnitz; this hoſtility unprovoked, and without any apparent motive, was either unknown at Paris, or pretended to be ſo.

It is poſſible even to go further, and although not with the ſame certainty of facts, yet with probability ſo ſtrong, that it will be with difficulty they are not admitted as truth. Every one knows that it was the faction of Briſſot that declared war againſt England; this faction was all-powerful at the commencement of the year 1793, and ſoon after that period the ſyſtem of Federaliſm was propoſed; by means of which, the principal cities in France were to be governed by their own particular laws, and, by being independent of the General Confederation, could call in ſuccour from England, and produce a diſmemberment of France.* If we recollect that Lyons at that very time revolted, and that Toulon ſoon after was delivered up to the Engliſh, we ſhall find it difficult to reject the ſuppoſition, that it was with the gold of England only, that the faction of Briſſot was bribed to declare War againſt England,

* To accompliſh this diſmemberment, has always been the principal aim of England: her Ambaſſador at Madrid had orders to ſolicit the Catholic King, to enter into the confederacy, and propoſed the province of Rouſſillon as his ſhare in the diviſion of the booty.—This offer having been rejected by Spain, who had entered into the War with reluctance, the ſolicitation was renewed, a courier having been ſent expreſs for this object only.

England, and afterwards to promulgate the principles of Federaliſm, which was to have been one of the grand inſtruments of this War: theſe circumſtances are ſo little doubted by the combined Powers, that they are conſidered as a ſufficient reaſon for their regarding England as principal, and themſelves as auxiliaries only in the conteſt.

The horror and fear teſtified from one end of Europe to the other, againſt French principles, and with which every diplomatic paper abounds, ſerve only as a blind to hide the ambition and private views of the different Powers: their fears on this head are not real. It is not to be ſuppoſed a reaſon of this kind could induce Ruſſia to enter into the confederacy; her geographical ſituation placing her out of the reach of French principles: beſides, it is ſufficiently known that Tartars are at preſent hardly able to comprehend the "Rights of Man," if introduced openly among them. Neither is it ſtate policy on the part of Pruſſia, where, for many reaſons, a revolution is not to be dreaded, and where it is more likely to be produced by uſeleſs Wars, and the impoveriſhed finances of the King, than by the example of the French; their reſpective territories alſo lying too wide apart, to admit of a direct communication with each other. I affirm even that the Emperor has no real fear of French principles; he fears them neither for his Hereditary States of Auſtria, the kingdom of Bohemia, nor that of Hungary,

Hungary; and I ſtate as a fact, that if all the Powers I have named, were not actuated by their ſeparate ambition, ſome aiming at conqueſt in France, and others at the enlargement of their reſpective foreign poſſeſſions, France never would have been attacked; neither would ſhe, if ſhe had NOT been in a ſtate to pay the expences of the War. Liberty, as well as Religion, ſerve admirably as ſtalking-horſes for ambition and tyranny.

It is difficult to conjecture the end and view of England, in thus arming all Europe at her own expence, and equipping the immenſe armaments ſhe has done at home; for, hitherto, we have not ſeen her make any conqueſt at all proportioned to her means, united to thoſe of the Continental Powers. The conqueſt of the Iſlands, which ſhe can ſcarcely expect to keep, cannot be worth the enormous expence ſhe has been at; and there is every reaſon to believe ſhe could have gained more by negociation, than by her fleets and armies. In Auguſt, 1793, the Sieur Deſcorches made overtures at Conſtantinople, with the Porte, to intercede for a ſeparate Peace with England, the moſt formidable enemy of France; agreeing, as a preliminary, to cede to her ſeveral of the French Weſt-India iſlands. This is what has been aſſerted at Conſtantinople, and other places, on the beſt authority; but the different Cabinets did not conceive it neceſſary to conſider this circumſtance; nor did they enter into any diſcuſſion on the ſubject, knowing that England would prefer

a War with France, to all her Weſt-India Iſlands, and poſſeſſions in America.

We may remark that every thing in nature is ſubject to change; all is in perpetual motion, retrograde, or progreſſive, and muſt inevitably become better or worſe. The liberty and proſperity of the Engliſh have been increaſing ſince the reign of the Stuarts: ſince the epoch of the Revolution, the acceſſion of the Houſe of Hanover has ſerved to renew the ideas of liberty, and to increaſe its value; the ſtruggles againſt the Pretender, were ſtruggles againſt tyranny; and even the ſeverities uſed toward the Jacobites, were favourable to the cauſe of liberty, inaſmuch as they attacked men who ſupported the principles of deſpotiſm, innate in the Houſe of Stuart. Since that time the liberty of England has been maintained without any viſible increaſe, except perhaps in the affair of Wilkes. The Revolution of France would have advanced its progreſs; but the War commenced, which broke the communication between the two countries, and ſerved as a pretext to inſpire againſt Liberty, the ſame horror that the Baſtille and Inquiſition excited under the ancient government. Liberty has been nicknamed *French* Liberty, a name hateful to the Engliſh populace, in order to render it odious in itſelf; as if the term *French* were incompatible with liberty; or as if her bleſſings could not be extended to every nation on the globe, but were the peculiar privilege of England, and excluſively poſſeſſed

poſſeſſed by her. Liberty, diſguiſed in various manners, ſometimes caricatured with rags and wretchedneſs, and at others exhibited in horror and blood, has been held up, or rather forced upon the attention of the Engliſh, in order to induce them to hug their own chains, and congratulate themſelves upon their ſuppoſed freedom. The bait has taken: Liberty, thus metamorphoſed, has been beheld with horror; and Slavery, varniſhed and tinſeled, has been eagerly embraced by a duped and ill-judging People, who are either incapable or too indolent to ſearch below the ſurface. I ſhall dwell no further on this circumſtance, but to mention that the Engliſh Conſtitution, ſo much boaſted of, muſt be, as we have remarked above, continually, and from neceſſity, ſubject to change: it muſt improve, or grow worſe; it muſt ever lie, like a veſſel, at the mercy of the wind and waves, driven by the powerful currents of tyranny and deſpotiſm. It cannot long remain unalterable.

Beſides this reaſon, which is of itſelf ſufficiently ſtrong, I will offer, without having recourſe to common-place arguments againſt the War, ſome other obſervations, which ought to engage the attention of Engliſhmen, and induce them to make Peace, and think of their own ſafety.

The French have placed themſelves, by their Revolution, in the predicament of *riſking all to ſave all*: their ſituation under the *ancien régime* not being any longer tolerable, they were neceſſitated

ſitated to have recourſe to the other extremity, to throw of their yoke; knowing well that ſuch an event was a great misfortune to a Nation, but that it was leſs ſo than ſlavery. They were not ignorant, that, being weakened by the ſtruggle, all their enemies would fall upon them; but they were ready to brave the foe; and the contemplation of the final object of their deſires was ſo ſtrong, that they formed the reſolution to obtain it, or periſh as aNation, and ſtake the chance of their exiſtence for their liberty. No perſon will diſpute that this extremity was deſperate; but the ſevere injuries that they ſuffered, forced them to it: they found themſelves in the ſituation of not being able to draw back, but abſolutely compelled to advance, let what would happen, though it might be the death of all—a leſs evil than the outrageous domination under which they groaned.

The picture of England was very different: ſhe had a liberty with which ſhe was content; her government was moderate; her proſperity was the envy of other people; and nothing ſhould have induced her to embark in a War, the conſequences of which might be ſuch as to put her exiſtence in doubt, and place her on a level with France. If it is unpleaſant even to contemplate the ſtorm on the ſea-ſhore, what blind fury muſt it be to throw one's ſelf into the middle of the tempeſt, in mere wantonneſs? In the mean while her proſperity decreaſes daily; her government acquires a power it never before had; voluntary contributions are raiſing,

raiſing, and ſhortly the principal part of the nation will be in arms: and will it not then be ſaid that England has taken the ſame ſteps to deſtroy her own liberty, that France has taken to acquire hers?

Secondly, it appears to me that this War may be conſidered in the ſame light as the firſt Punic War, in which commenced, between the Romans and Carthaginians, that mortal hatred, which could not terminate but with the deſtruction of one or the other; it was neceſſary that Carthage or Rome ſhould be deſtroyed. Such, it is probable, will be the hatred that this War will produce, accompanied as it is with the moſt odious treaſon, diſgraceful to a great Nation; and with ſuch a blood-thirſty cruelty, that the moſt barbarous means, contrary to the rights of war, and laws of nations, have been uſed, if we except the laſt reſource, that of poiſoned weapons, which may perhaps be ſtill had recourſe to; for that is ſurely not more contrary to humanity, than the diabolical and ferocious project of ſtarving to death a whole Nation. Can it be believed that a people, proud and brave, and who will one day be the moſt powerful in Europe, who diſdains to accept bread accompanied with chains, of its enemies, will ever forget the barbarous intention of deſtroying, by the moſt cruel means, twenty-five millions of human beings, men, women, and children? If after ſo many battles, in which ſhe has remained victorious, this armed Nation ſhould finally

finally remain miſtreſs of the field, what conditions can we ſuppoſe ſhe will not dictate to the vanquiſhed? Ought not England to expect that, forgetting her other enemies, or *forming an alliance with them*, ſhe will turn her whole vengeance upon a people who have ſworn her ruin? It is not difficult to foreſee the iſſue of this conteſt. The power of France eſtabliſhed by the moſt glorious victories, ſtrengthened by a government free and republican; the warlike ſpirit of a Nation innumerable in ſoldiers and ſeamen; her inveterate hatred to England; her vicinity, that facilitates her enterpriſes; all theſe circumſtances ſeem to predict, and that at no very diſtant period, the entire downfall of the power of Great-Britain: for this War will be of ſuch a nature, that one of the Nations will be deſtroyed, or become tributary to the other; France to England, or England to France. And in this combat of extremity, for whom are the probabilities of victory greateſt? For the Power who, ſupported by all Europe, has not overcome its enemies; or that, who alone has vanquiſhed the moſt formidable league ever formed, and triumphed over Europe?

Beſides, it is further to be conſidered, that the hatred of all the maritime Nations accumulated againſt England, will make her find enemies on every ſide; and her abaſement will be a cauſe of rejoicing to all thoſe whom ſhe has inſulted and oppreſſed, during her proſperity. Already America, Denmark, and Sweden, are arming to maintain

tain their neutrality againſt her: Ruſſia has towards her ſentiments entirely hoſtile; Spain hates her as her natural enemy; Holland cannot do otherwiſe; Portugal the ſame; the republics of Italy fear and hate her.---If ſuch are the diſpoſitions of the maritime Powers againſt England, in the time of her proſperity, what will they be when her authority ſhall be curtailed? I fear to mention it, but all Nations will rejoice; many will gain by her ruin, and none will loſe.

Such is the lowering proſpect for England, if France is victorious: the longer the war laſts, the more implacable ſhe will become. Can we doubt that this will be the iſſue of the preſent conteſt? Can we flatter ourſelves that the Allies, now almoſt ruined, will attain what they could not accompliſh in their more flouriſhing ſtate, and when a ſpirit of diſunion prevailed in France? And can we flatter ourſelves that, if the armies of France have not been conquered, an armed Nation may be? Can we perſuade ourſelves that Germany, riſen in a maſs, will fight with more ſucceſs for Slavery, than all France has done for Liberty?

As it has appeared that great confidence has been placed in this riſing in maſs of the provinces of Germany in the neighbourhood of France, as well as in the army of the Empire, I will ſtate for what reaſon theſe two means appear to me to be not only inſufficient, but even dangerous, for the cauſe in ſupport of which they are adopted.

It has never been conſidered that, to imitate the French National Convention, we muſt be poſſeſſed of her power; we muſt have the ſame motive to offer to the people---we muſt imitate her Liberty.

It is eaſy enough to ſee that not one of the Princes of Europe poſſeſſes power ſo extenſive as that of the National Convention. The firſt reign by virtue of an eſtabliſhed order, and by the laws of their reſpective countries; as ſoon as that order is overthrown, and theſe laws are aboliſhed, their reign is at an end, and they are then nothing; for the cauſe that made them exiſts no longer, (*and a Revolution like that made by themſelves abſolves*), and the People are abſolved from their oath of fidelity; they then return to their primitive rights. It is not the ſame with a National Convention; this is a body delegated by the People, with a power without limits, and with the ſpecial commiſſion to do all and every thing that is uſeful to the People. She deſtroys one Conſtitution, and forms another; the opinions, laws, and religion of a country, are powers ſubordinate to hers; ſhe repreſents the Sovereignty of the People; her power is ſuch as will admit of no controul; no Sovereign with the moſt abſolute power in the moſt deſpotic State, neither a Dictator of Rome, nor the Tribunal of *Amphictyons* in Greece, had any power equal to it.

The Princes will then fail in their attempts to raiſe Nations in maſs, to the extent imagined; this

this can only be produced by a National Convention. Under what pretext will they order their requiſitions? The National Convention ſay, "Let every citizen take arms, and defend the liberty which we have given him, as well as the liberty of the whole Nation, otherwiſe he will be condemned as a traitor, and puniſhed with death." The Princes ſay, "We command all our loving ſubjects to quit their daily occupations, and take arms, in order to defend our government, and preſerve their own ſlavery; in order that they may continue to work out a wretched exiſtence, with ſcarcely ſufficient food to enable them to ſupport their miſery; that we may preſerve our honour, and our authority, and that we may continue to govern them as ſeverely, and, if neceſſary, with more rigour than we have hitherto done." Can ony one imagine that this diſcourſe would be liſtened to favourably, and that theſe orders would be ſcrupulouſly followed by a people, where every individual is diſſatisfied with his ſituation? An armed Nation has no longer a maſter.

In ſhort, for a Nation to riſe in maſs, all the vigour of a revolutionary government will be requiſite. Will the Princes, in order to avoid a revolution, begin it by introducing a revolutionary government?

As to the army of the Empire, it is only neceſſary to obſerve, that it will not be organized before the end of the campaign in which it is to

ſerve; all the examples of the armies of the Empire, warrant this aſſertion.

Such are the new means, by which it is preſumed the Allies will achieve the conqueſt of France, whoſe frontiers the ſtricteſt-diſciplined armies, and beſt-appointed Generals, have ſcarcely penetrated in two years. But whenever this War may end, the reſult muſt be

Either that France ſhall remain victorious over her enemies; and in that caſe we can predict that ſhe will, in her turn, ſwear to ruin England:

Or, that the combined Powers will ſucceed in eſtabliſhing the *ancien régime*, and replace the Houſe of Bourbon on the throne. (Permit me to diſcuſs this hypotheſis, extravagant as it is.) And if ſo, what has England to hope therefrom? Will ſhe ceaſe to be the natural enemy and rival of France? Can any one believe that a future King of France will conſider himſelf indebted to any Power, that ſhall have reſtored him a monarchy in fragments and tatters; of which the commerce and marine are ruined; who has been deſpoiled of Corſica; of her poſſeſſions in the two Indies; of Alſace and Lorraine on the one ſide, and Rouſſillon on the other; of Dunkirk in the Engliſh Channel, and Toulon in the Mediterranean; and whoſe principal bulwarks on the coaſt of Flanders ſhall be deſtroyed? Or rather, will he not reſerve all his gratitude for the Empreſs of Ruſſia, who has protected and careſſed the Princes of his houſe, at the time that England inſulted them?

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The Count d'Artois ſent from Hull, and the gates of Toulon ignominiouſly ſhut againſt Monſieur, notwithſtanding the moſt preſſing ſolicitations of Spain—will theſe be the inducements to eſtabliſh harmony between the two Powers? I have ſuppoſed a poſſibility of re-eſtabliſhing monarchy in France: but no—the ſuppoſition is too extravagant; no man of common ſenſe can have the hope: no—it is not with that idea that England has made War.

Nevertheleſs, whatever may be the event, whether France remains a Republic, or becomes a Monarchy, I ſhould not be aſtoniſhed, if, of all the Powers that were to offer her alliance, or ſought for hers, the Empreſs of Ruſſia was to be the firſt; and this alliance would be principally grounded on their common hatred to England. If it is ſaid that the difference of intereſt, in regard to Turkey, would be an hindrance to this alliance, I reply, that on this head, all the Powers of Europe have, with France, a common intereſt againſt Ruſſia; that will not in the leaſt impede her allying herſelf to the latter; that England is the moſt ſeriouſly intereſted in the ſupport of the Ottoman Empire, on account of her commerce with it, as well as to counteract the aggrandiſement of Ruſſia, and to prevent her admiſſion into the Mediterranean; and that, at this moment, a treaty of alliance is negociating at Peterſburgh, between England and the Empreſs, which, to ſpeak the truth, has hitherto been only pregnant with difficulties,

culties, England demanding, as a principal condition, that Ruſſia ſhall co-operate againſt France, which ſhe has conſtantly refuſed, with an invincible obſtinacy; probably with a view to procure a reconciliation with the greater facility, in caſe the Allies ſhould prove unſucceſsful. It is indeed ſaid, that the treaty has lately been concluded, in which the Empreſs engages that two fleets ſhall be equipped and ſent, one to the Baltic, and the other to the North Seas, to winter in England. Troops of the line are alſo promiſed, if circumſtances ſhould require them. The Britiſh Miniſtry, however, it may very well be ſuppoſed, place but little faith in theſe promiſes, which ſeem to have been given only to amuſe.

In fact, if we ſuppoſe the re-eſtabliſhment of Monarchy to take place in France, it will apparently be a Prince of the Houſe of Bourbon, (which is far from being extinct) who will be placed on the throne. Now what are the obligations which that Houſe will have to the coaleſced Powers? To England they have been already detailed. To the Emperor, who has ſought only to invade her provinces, and has ſeen executed a King and Queen, his near relations, without ſhewing any other mark of grief than a court mourning? To Spain, who by her puſillanimity, and in obedience to England, did not dare (though her moſt ardent wiſhes were to do it) to ſuccour, or receive her Princes; but remained deaf to their moſt preſſing ſolicitation? To Pruſſia, who, a ſtranger to their cauſe,

cauſe, has ſcarcely ſhewn any other mark of attachment to the French Princes, than by permitting them to reſide at Ham in Weſtphalia? Whereas the Empreſs has treated them with the moſt marked attention; flattered them with promiſes; and (which no other Power has done) ſhe has furniſhed them with money, and recommended their cauſe with all the warmth of friendſhip. If ſhe has not ſent troops, the diſtance between their reſpective countries, and the want of them for her own purpoſes, muſt appear in their eyes a ſufficient excuſe.

If France remains a Republic, the alliance between her and Ruſſia will be the more eaſily cemented, from the hatred that each bears to England; for if France, reſtored to a Monarchy, ought to hate England, what will ſhe not do, if ſhe remains a Republic, in ſpite of England? The Empreſs of Ruſſia has beſides fully explained herſelf, at to the little fears ſhe entertains from the progreſs of French principles in her territories; and on that account ſhe can form an alliance with more ſecurity than any European Power. The liberty of the French would make as little impreſſion in Ruſſia, as the worſhip of Mahomet, practiſed by the Ottoman Ambaſſadors, which never converted the people of Vienna and Berlin: and the ſpectacle of Liberty would be to the Ruſſians as the Muſſulman's ablutions are to the Germans, an object of curioſity and aſtoniſhment.

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The reſult of the whole is, that England, in labouring with an immenſe expence, and at the price of her own ruin, to eſtabliſh Monarchy in France, only works for her enemies; and ſo far from gaining a friend in the re-eſtabliſhed Houſe of Bourbon, ſhe will only have an irritated and more implacable enemy. Beſides, can ſhe hope to keep the conqueſts ſhe has made, or may make? Are they in any manner guaranteed? Does ſhe flatter herſelf that a King of France, re-eſtabliſhed on his throne, would let her enjoy them in peace? Does ſhe think Spain, America, Holland, and above all, Ruſſia, in ſhort, that all the other maritime Powers, would ſuffer her to become the arbitreſs of the commerce of the world? Or that the continental Powers, who would feel the effect of her monopoly, would tamely ſubmit to ſuch an aggrandizement of her power?

She ought therefore to expect, after a poſſeſſion perhaps of a few years, in which ſhe has contributed to the amelioration of her conqueſts, that ſhe will be obliged to ſurrender them, after having, to obtain them, almoſt ruined herſelf.

We have ſeen what England has to expect, if the French Republic remains victorious; and the recompence ſhe may look for, if France becomes a Monarchy. Let us now examine what ſhe has to hope for in the third poſſible caſe, which perhaps is the moſt probable of all, that in which the league, broken and divided in itſelf, will ſink

under its own weight; the exhauſted ſtate of the two parties will then put an end to the War, France, notwithſtanding, remaining free: the reſult will then be, not a complete victory of the coaleſced Powers over France, nor of France over the coalition—but of a mixed kind, an hermaphrodite, which is the production of all wars, and of all leagues, as was the caſe in the Seven-years War. In this caſe, England alone will be conquered: the other Powers, who will have retired in time, and who, inſtead of ruining themſelves, will only have contributed to the ruin of England, they will not be conquered, although not victorious; they will ſubſiſt by the ruin of England, who, having borne the enormous expence of the War, which will have finiſhed with a doubtful victory, will have to encounter alone the whole force of an enemy ſhe has made furious, and of other enemies, who are in no ſmall number in the different parts of Europe. The conqueſts ſhe may have made will reſt upon as ſlender a ſecurity as in the two preceding ſuppoſitions, and will as completely exhauſt her reſources: for ſhe ought to conſider, that it is impoſſible to ruin France, in ſo great a degree as ſhe will herſelf; as there will always remain for the former double the reſources, from her population and territories; reſources that the preſent means adopted in France will ſtill augment to an incalculable height, and which will place her above all compariſon with

the forces of England, and the means ſhe may employ to put them in motion.

It is clear, from all that I have advanced, firſt, that England is the principal in this War; and ſecondly, that ſhe can expect no real advantage from it, let it terminate as it may.

Let us now examine what motive England can have to continue ſo terrible a War, and at ſuch an enormous expence. The reaſons that have been alledged for entering into it exiſting no longer, it remains only for us to examine the motives for continuing it. I will not ſay any thing of the conditions that have been propoſed as preliminaries of Peace, *indemnity for the paſt, and ſecurity for the future*; theſe terms being ſo vague and undefined, as to admit of whatever ſignification we may chooſe, or rather, have no meaning at all. They may be conſidered as the haughty propoſals of a conqueror, where the ſenſe may be extended without limits againſt a beaten enemy. If the object of *indemnity and ſecurity* had been ſpecified, two things would reſult therefrom; either that the door would be ſhut to all future negociation, or that it might immediately begin. It behoved the Cabinet of St. James's to avoid placing itſelf in either of theſe ſituations, from the uncertainty of ſucceſs: for, on the one hand, it was well known, that France was too ſtrong and proud to ſubmit to humiliating terms; and on the other, her deſire for Peace was alſo known. We ought then to have avoided irritating her more; nor

ſhould

ſhould we have held out inducements for her to place dependence on our ſincerity or aſſiſtance: ſteering between would have given ſatisfaction to all. As no ſpecific object has been ſtated in the conditions, of *indemnity for the paſt, and ſecurity for the future*, the attention of no perſon is engaged by them. It is thus that nations ſpeak, when in hopes of conquering; but when their hopes are ſuch, that they are obliged to conceal their projects under the moſt ambiguous terms.

If, in examining the end propoſed from this War, we ſhould run over all the hypotheſis, we ſhall find that England is deſirous of making conqueſts, and that it is a war of aggrandiſement; but it is clearly demonſtrated that continental poſſeſſions are rather prejudicial than advantageous to England. She has ſeen, that no one can have ſolid hopes of making conqueſts in the interior of France; and that if any other city was to ſurrender, and truſt to the protection of the Allies, it would inevitably ſhare the fate of Toulon, which will ſerve as a warning to the reſt, not to imitate her treaſon, even if ſuch a diſpoſition ſhould exiſt. If ſhe were even to take all the iſlands, ſhe has little certainty of being able to keep them.

Does England then ſuppoſe, that by this War ſhe will be able to preſerve to herſelf the ſole dominion of the ſea, and commerce of the world? She could with greater probability have done it by means of neutrality and negociation.

But England perhaps has only in view from this War the deſtruction of France, the ruin of its marine, and perhaps for a time to come its polical conſequence: yet, in deſtroying her enemy, ſhe deſtroys herſelf, and with much more rapidity, as we have before obſerved. She might, perhaps, have ſome chance of ſucceſs, and might hope to effect the ruin of France, if ſhe was ſeriouſly ſeconded by the Allies; but ſince theſe have found out the ſecret of making war at her expence, and that not only her enemy, but even her friends and aſſociates, have an intereſt in her ruin, it follows that it is more likely ſhe will be exhauſted than France. As to the navy of the latter, the firſt blow that was ſtruck againſt her was the effect of intrigue and treaſon, and was followed by events diſhonourable for Great-Britain, and for which ſhe will be eternally ſtigmatized. The victory of the firſt of June, which formed a contraſt to the conflagration at Toulon, produced more glory than utility: ten ſhips of the line were loſt to the Republic, but an immenſe convoy of victuallers arrived ſafe in her ports; her ſeamen were inſtructed, and proved; and her ſquadrons now keep at ſea, while thoſe of England remain in port; and by one of thoſe ſtrange and unlooked-for events, which the Revolution has produced, and which has ſo often aſtoniſhed the Cabinets and Miniſters of State, we ſhall ſee her fleets multiply in the ſame proportion as we have ſeen her armies. Perhaps this War has been under-

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taken and continued with ſuch animoſity, for the purpoſe of turning the thoughts of the Nation from an object that had engaged its attention too ſtrongly; the Reform of Parliament. This reform, it is ſaid, from the prevalency of French principles, would lead to conſequences not eaſily foreſeen, and would increaſe the abuſes complained of: yet ſurely conſequences far more ſerious, more to be dreaded, are likely to be produced by this very mode adopted to prevent them. Certainly means more ridiculous, or new, were never had recourſe to, to prevent a Nation from reforming its government, than by plunging it into inextricable difficulties, and of a nature to threaten its diſſolution. It reſembles the celebrated Doctor Sangrado, who bled all his patients to death, to prevent their dying of a plethory.

In this caſe, we have to admire, not thoſe who have ſo adroitly found means to engage us in the War, but the patience and good-nature of the Engliſh Nation, who ſacrifice themſelves, in order to have the pleaſure of being ſacrificed.

If ſuch be the truth, and if ſuch be the final end of the War; if, in ſhort, this be not a War of the People to enſure their Liberty, or to augment their proſperity, but a War of the Adminiſtration againſt the People, it muſt be confeſſed, that the French Revolution has produced the moſt bitter fruit indeed for the Engliſh nation; a War to bring it to Slavery, the greateſt of all human evils. The French, in the midſt of all the calamities

they

they ſuffer, in the very height of the mourning of each family, have at leaſt the pleaſing conſolation, that thoſe who have fallen in the battle, have fallen for the glorious cauſe of Liberty, and the laws of their country. "*Paſſenger, go and tell unto Sparta, that we died here in obedience to her ſacred laws!*" Such is the affecting epitaph which decorates the unadorned tombs of the brave youth who expired at Jemappe and Nerwinde. It is thus that Hampden, and the brave heroes who fought with him againſt tyranny, died for their country: they fell for the cauſe of humanity, and for their own; for the happineſs of their wives, their children, and friends; and we pay them eternal honour and an everlaſting tribute of affection: while ſlaves, however the cauſe of their tyrant may triumph, never obtain any other renown, but that of having been ſtupidly ſeduced, and for having fought, in their ignorance, a premature death, for a cauſe that was in nowiſe good—a vile crowd, that no one pities, or deigns to bury; they cover with their infected carcaſes the plains which they ought to have cultivated in joy and health.

Animæ viles, infleta inhumataque turba
Sternamur campis.

It appears to be beyond a doubt, by all that has been demonſtrated, that the preſent War is a ruinous one, equally againſt the liberty and proſperity of England; and that it can never procure any ſolid advantage of a long duration. Now every

every man of ſenſe, as ſoon as he perceives that he is embarked in a ridiculous or wicked undertaking, ſtops while there is yet time, and does not precipitate himſelf into ruin, for the empty honour of not yielding; like one who, ridiculouſly miſcalling his ill-timed obſtinacy and perſeverance, ſtupidly ſuppoſes that, by refraining from a nefarious purſuit, he ſhould prepare a triumph for his enemies.

It cannot have eſcaped notice, that one of the principal means employed to render this War implacable, and to engage the Nation to throw itſelf blindly into meaſures the moſt violent, has been to load the French nation with ignominy, that ſhe might retort the inſult; and that this War, where the people are nothing, might become a national war; a combat of injuries, and of hatred of nation to nation. But it is very remarkable, that theſe means, ſo adroitly put in motion, and for the ſucceſs of which no pains or expence has been ſpared, has not had the ſucceſs that was expected, becauſe the French nation very wiſely contained itſelf, and, ſeeing the ſnare that was laid, avoided it by continuing to reſpect the Engliſh nation; nor has ſhe ever ſhewn hoſtility but againſt its Government. Certainly it is a ſpectacle worthy of better times, the ſight of two great Nations ſtriving who ſhall honour and eſteem each other the moſt, while their Governments are reciprocally loading each other with the moſt opprobrious epithets.

It can be undeniably proved, that even to the preſent time, although France has experienced, on the part of the Britiſh Government, all that the moſt inveterate hatred can invent; inſults the moſt odious; the invaſion of her territory; a city ſurpriſed by treaſon; the continual ſyſtem of ſeduction, and the corruption of her citizens, even in very boſom of the Convention, by which means more Frenchmen have died on the ſcaffold, than by the ſword of the Engliſh; in ſhort, the abominable project of ſtarving a whole Nation—yet, notwithſtanding theſe outrages, ſhe continues to treat with more tenderneſs* the Engliſh priſoners, than thoſe of other nations with whom ſhe is at war. She reſpects in them the Engliſh nation, whom ſhe has honoured, and for whom ſhe has always had a ſtrong predilection. At the commencement of the Revolution, and at the time that England was clandeſtinely preparing a frightful War, France ſhewed to the Engliſh nation a ſtrong partiality, and praiſed her above all others. Why did ſhe do it? Was ſhe deſirous to lull an enemy to ſleep, in order to rob her of her poſſeſſions, and take her unprepared? No: ſhe only deſired to ſatisfy herſelf, in honouring what is honourable. She wiſhed only that no injury might be done her.

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* This was written before the decree of the Convention forbid them to give no quarter to the Engliſh: this decree has not yet been put in execution, though it probably would, if it had been againſt the Auſtrians.— al likelihood it will not be long before it is revoked.

She was deſirous that the Engliſh nation ſhould protect her againſt what ſhe had then to fear fro n her government, and leave her in peace to eſtabliſh her liberty. When ſhe took arms, and when the firſt battle commenced between the two people, who felt that they had no reaſon to quarrel, the ſoldiers the moſt advanced, who ſaw the firſt Engliſh troops, cried: "We are not *your* enemies; retire; we will not fire on you."

Since that period, theſe diſpoſitions have not changed; and, in ſpite of all the arts that have been put in practice, they have not been able to make the French nation the enemies of the Engliſh people. Peace will be received by each with the ſame avidity; they will feel equally happy to ſee terminated, a War that cannot appear natural; to have no longer to deplore that their arms are raiſed to murdei each other, but that they may both return to cultivate their fields, and improve their manufactories, in the profits of which they will equally participate from their mutual commerce.

But it is ſaid, that we cannot treat with the French nation, becauſe it has no fixed government, and becauſe, by that means, we ſhould acknowledge the French Republic. In the firſt place, the Government that has the power of making War, has that of making Peace. If it ſhould change, the Peace that it has made, will not change. The alliance that was contracted by the ancient French Government with America, ſubſiſts

with equal, nay, with greater vigour, notwithſtanding the Government exiſts no longer, becauſe that alliance was founded on the intereſts of the two countries, as a Peace would between England and France. And, ſecondly, how long has it been claimed as a right to make war on a People, with a view of regulating their private laws and cuſtoms, or until they ſhould govern themſelves according to the caprice of another Nation? If the French are rebels, they are not ſo to England; they have not ſhaken off her government; they are a people free and independent, and ought to be conſidered as they were before, in the light of ſtrangers. But I will add further.

The Government of England has treated with her own rebels, if we may uſe the term: the Americans lived under her laws, and ſwore fidelity to them. Victory has decided the quarrel, and the Americans are become what the French were before the War, and without victory; that is to ſay, ſtrangers to England, and independent of her. Nevertheleſs, this ſame Britiſh Government has renounced her dominion over them, and even treated with them as an independent people.—With France there is no dominion to be renounced; ſhe can treat with the French as an independent people, for they certainly are not dependent, nor ever have been, upon England.

Let me be permitted here to aſk one very ſimple queſtion: If, by any unforeſeen event, the Britiſh Miniſtry were to be diſplaced, would not

all

all thoſe difficulties diſappear of themſelves? And would they not treat immediately with the French, without amuſing themſelves in examining whether the government of France was ſufficiently fixed, or whether the glory of England would ſuffer by acknowledging an additional Republic? There can then be but little force in theſe arguments and objections againſt Peace; ſince a change, of ſo little conſequence in reality, immediately removes them. And it appears, that if five or ſix individuals, without ſuffering any real evil to their perſons, were only to loſe their places, and ſome thouſands of pounds per annum, it would prevent the death of perhaps half a million of men, who leave behind them as many more to deplore their loſs.

If we ſearch for examples, the hiſtory of England itſelf will furniſh an inſtance exactly ſimilar to that in queſtion.

* "*In* 1651 *the States General received at the Hague, two Ambaſſadors from the Engliſh Parliament; Oliver St. John, and Walter Strickland.*" Now it muſt be remarked, that the States General ſo little acknowledged the Engliſh Republic, that "*theſe Ambaſſadors returned very diſſatisfied, being confirmed in their ſuſpicion that the States only wanted a favourable opportunity to declare openly for the King.*"

Again, in the middle of the war that followed, between them and the Engliſh Parliament, the States General reſolved to name four Ambaſſadors

* Rapin, Vol. IX, book 22.

to negociate for Peace in London, which they concluded in 1654.

It is not unworthy of obſervation, that Holland at that time played the ſame part towards England that ſhe now plays in regard to France; for it is to be remarked, that "*it was only Holland, at that time, that gave cauſe of fear to the Parliament of England, and who was in a ſituation to give material aſſiſtance to the Royaliſts.*" Nevertheleſs, this ſame Power finiſhed an unfortunate War, with ſueing to that ſame Engliſh Parliament for Peace, and by obtaining it on very diſadvantageous terms. Neither muſt we forget to mention that "*it was not the States who ſhewed moſt diſpoſition to appoint Ambaſſadors; nor was it reſolved upon till the two provinces of Holland and Zealand, that ſuffered moſt by the war, obliged them to it.*"

If there was no other conſideration but the difficulty that appears in negociating with France, I aſk whether we do not ſee Neutral Nations treat with her, and preſerve their ancient treaties; neither complaining of faith in the Convention, nor of the inſtability of her government? There are even two ſorts of Neutral Powers; thoſe who acknowledge the French Republic, and receive her ambaſſadors, as America, and Switzerland; and thoſe who do not acknowledge her formally, or receive her ambaſſadors, as Denmark, Sweden, and others. Now all theſe Powers treat for their different intereſts, and in the greateſt confidence, with the National Convention; and have rather

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reaſon to felicitate themſelves on their conduct in ſo doing, than to conſider it as a matter of regret. Nor can we but admire the wiſe conduct of the National Convention towards the Neutral Powers; ſtruggling alone againſt all Europe, not having a ſingle Power, or one Ally to ſupport her cauſe, nor receiving the leaſt ſuccour from any quarter of the univerſe, either in men, or money, to defend her againſt the formidable league who beſiege her: notwithſtanding all which, ſhe demands nothing unjuſt of the Nations with whom ſhe is on good terms. Not propoſing to them alliances which might compromiſe their ſafety, but rather ſeeking their intereſt, in order to enrich themſelves reciprocally by their commerce; ſhe ſeems to have had more at heart the intereſt of Neutral Nations, than her own: ſhe has regarded them with a liberality and delicacy unexampled among Nations; and certainly, if we cannot treat with ſuch a People, there is not one upon the earth we can treat with.

We hear it obſerved daily, that the proſperity, laws, and religion of England, depend on the continuance of the War. They ought rather to ſay, that they depend upon a ſpeedy Peace; for this War, in creating alarms and apprehenſions in the people for their laws and liberty (which they have ſeen ſo openly violated), and by continuing to exhauſt the nation of her riches, to hire the mercenaries of all Europe, tends evidently to produce calamities and tumults of ſuch a nature, as totally

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to preclude religion and ſubordination. In a word, ſhe is preparing, by its continuance, her own overthrow.

I now come to the laſt objection that can be offered againſt Peace; to remove which, is the principal intention of this diſcuſſion, in which we ſhall prove, that the re-eſtabliſhment of Peace is yet poſſible, and upon terms equally honourable for the two Nations; for the honour of a Nation is to be conſidered, inaſmuch as it inſpires confidence and valour in its People.

England, it is ſaid, cannot offer to treat, leſt it ſhould be conſidered as aſking for Peace; beſides, ſhe ought not to take ſuch a ſtep at the time her enemy is rather victorious than vanquiſhed.—There remain, however, means more ſimple, and leſs humiliating to each party, to re-eſtabliſh Peace between the Belligerent Powers.

For this effect, it is neceſſary to conſider that the primitive cauſes that were alledged for undertaking this War, either do no longer exiſt, or that ſuch as remain are in their nature rather ſubjects for negociation than War. That the contention at preſent is become more complicated and confuſed, from the diverſity of intereſts of the coaleſced Pawers; from the obſcurity of the declarations, and manifeſtoes, that have been made; and from the ſucceſſive events in France, which have ſo often changed the foundation of, and motives for the War: ſo that theſe may now be ſimplified, and reduced to a ſingle queſtion, that of

re-eſtabliſhing Monarchy, or bringing about a Counter-revolution in France. If his Britannic Majeſty would declare, and oblige his Allies to declare, that it is not their intention to interfere in the internal government of France, nor prejudge the rights of the French Nation, as to the form of government that they may chooſe to adopt; ſo ſoon as ſuch a declaration is made, the War may be conſidered as at an end. The honour of the Britiſh nation would not be compromiſed: neither the King of England, nor the coaleſced Princes, would do other than fulfil their promiſes on this head; they would but confirm their firſt declaration: they have prepared for themſelves this honourable reſource, in not acknowledging hitherto the Brother of the deceaſed King, as Regent of France, or his Son, as the ſucceſſor to the throne. But this declaration ought to be ſincere, and proof given that it is ſo.

The more I reflect on this matter, the more I am convinced that ſuch a declaration would be productive of pacific meaſures between the two contending Nations, who are equally tired of the War. In fact, the greater part of the coaleſced Powers ſeek only how to withdraw themſelves with honour. In proof of this, we may conſider the retreat of the King of Pruſſia; the backwardneſs and exhauſted finances of Auſtria; the diſaffection of Holland; the deſire of Spain to confine herſelf to a defenſive War at moſt; are publicly known; there is even an appearance, that the only motive

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that prevents the Britiſh Cabinet from retreating, is her want of power to produce proofs of her having attained a compenſation for her immenſe expences; but the Nation is ſo deſirous of Peace, thar ſhe would now gladly accept of it, without a very ſcrupulous enquiry into the minutiæ of Court jargon, of indemnities, compenſations, &c. It is Peace that England wants, and not conqueſt: Peace would cauſe her to forget all her misfortunes, which even her conqueſts would but prolong. On the other hand, France has made War, and ſuch a terrible War as the preſent, ſolely for the cauſe of her Liberty: ſhe was reſolved to periſh, or be free Liberty has given her that almoſt ſupernatural courage and vigour which ſhe has diſplayed. When her Liberty is no longer in danger, ſhe will become like another nation; ſhe will loſe her enthuſiaſm; ſhe will no longer ſhew the ſame ardour for War, but only wiſh for Peace. Let her then be left to enjoy that Liberty, which ſhe has purchaſed at ſo dear a rate, (and which ſhe will purchaſe at a much dearer, ſhould it be neceſſary), and there will no longer exiſt a ſufficient cauſe for her continuing the War.

It is to be underſtood alſo, that, in giving up the idea of effecting a Counter-revolution in France, the Royaliſts muſt be abandoned, and the Emigrants diſarmed: by theſe means, the War will loſe its moſt envenomed edge, and ſink into an ordinary war, like every other that is entered into with the view of making conqueſts, and which, after

after a certain time, finiſhes in negociation. As a phyſician, who preſcribes for a gangrened body; if once he effects the deſtruction of the gangrene, which menaced the patient with death, the remaining wound is ſoon healed, and the ſufferer is declared out of danger. The declaration that I propoſe would produce the ſame effect; it would ſtop torrents of blood; it would ſave England and other Powers from civil wars, and Europe from the Revolution with which ſhe is threatened.

When I ſay that the Royaliſts muſt be abandoned, I do not mean that we ought wholly to abandon the unfortunate; but that we ſhould not flatter them with hopes (which they themſelves have partly renounced) of conquering France. For who among them have expectations of again paying their court to a future King at Verſailles, or aſſiſting in the proceſſion of the *Chandeleur?* Certainly thoſe who entertain ſuch hopes are to be pitied; but no reaſon can juſtify the ſacrificing the blood of Nations in the purſuit of the vain chimeras of their imagination. Beſides, it is evident they engage the attention of Miniſtry but ſlightly; their cauſe is not at preſent even made a pretence: when we ſee them led to the war as to a ſlaughter-houſe, without capitulation, without any honours of war to expect, it appears as if they were conſidered, at St. James's, in the ſame light as by *Barnave*. "*Is, then, their blood ſo pure?*"— They require other ſuccour. It was without doubt a glorious ſpectacle to ſee England open

her arms to receive the exiled French: it was not Proteſtants that ſuccoured Catholics, nor Engliſh who offered an aſylum to the French; the diſtinction of nation and religion was forgot; it was man befriending man. It is pleaſant to reflect on this great example of national benevolence, not without a ſentiment of compaſſion for the misfortunes of nations, as well as individuals: indeed, in the ſame manner as the latter ſhew themſelves humane towards their fellow-citizens in diſtreſs, and find in their turn, when aſſailed by misfortune, a relief they had formerly given; ſo nations prepare themſelves friends for a future period, when the time of adverſity ſhall come, and when the calamities which ſhall deſtroy the proſperity of individuals, and national conſtitutions, ſhall oblige them to ſeek with the poſterity of their preſent gueſts a return for their former benefits.

We ſhould alſo adviſe the Royaliſts not to abandon themſelves to deſpair, but remove from them thoſe diſcouraging ſentiments which uſually attend the unfortunate. The ancient Republics preſent us with various examples of baniſhed people, who, having ceaſed to deplore their misfortunes, have ſought other countries, and founded new States.

———Teucer Salamina patremque
Cum fugeret, tamen uda Lycao,
Tempora populeâ fertur viciſſe coronâ;
Certus enim promiſit Apollo,
Ambiguam tellure nova Salamina futuram.

But without having recourſe to the examples of the ancients, who certainly entertained more exalted ſentiments than the moderns, what is the origin of that powerful Republic of America? And do we not ſee, at Berlin, and in Holland, flouriſhing colonies founded originally by Emigrants, whoſe deſcendants have almoſt forgotten the cruelties of Louis XIV. and the ſalubrious climate of France?

After ſuch a declaration as the above mentioned ſhall have been made, we may reaſonably flatter ourſelves that the minds of men would grow calm, and that the equitable language of the Britiſh Miniſters would inſpire the Members of the National Convention with a language equally moderate; for if we were to judge by the expreſſions which both Governments have uſed hitherto, it would appear that each Nation had reſolved on eternal War; England propoſing to compel France to ſue for Peace, and France pretending, with equal right, to reduce her enemy to the ſame terms. Now before theſe two powerful Nations ſhould be exhauſted, the conteſt might continue for many generations, and we ſhould bequeath to our poſterity, with an immenſe national debt, the War (fooliſhly undertaken) which has cauſed it. The language of France is, however, the moſt juſt; the Republic ſays, ſhe does not treat with an enemy who is in poſſeſſion of her territory: England has nothing of the kind to alledge, the intereſt of her Allies being much more an object of negociation.

But, in reality, who will aſk for Peace firſt? or, as this queſtion may appear idle, Where will Peace be made? Will it be on the Ocean, or in Flanders? In Flanders, moſt probably; for, if Flanders ſhould be conquered, and Holland menaced, one or more naval victories will not force the Republic to demand Peace. Now it appears that England runs the greateſt riſk; for, however victorious ſhe may be by ſea, if ſhe be beaten in Flanders, ſhe will be obliged to aſk for Peace; and it is well known that her chief ſtrength does not conſiſt in her land forces: whereas France muſt be beaten equally by land and ſea, to ſue for it; and, even in that caſe ſhe could not, from the critical ſituation ſhe would be in, demand peace of a conqueror, who would propoſe chains and ſlavery to her: ſhe would rather chooſe to accompliſh herſelf the political deſtruction with which ſhe is threatened, and pull down her enemies in her fall: the example of three years War, in which ſhe has been at times within a hair's-breadth of her ruin, warrants this aſſertion; we have never ſeen her diſmayed, or deplore aught of a conquering enemy; ſhe has certainly riſked her exiſtence; and we have ſeen with what facility ſhe has played the great ſtake of *all for all*. It appears then that, in this long and doubtful alternative, the means propoſed in this work would remove ſome of the obſtacles to Peace; after which, the ice being broken, the remaining difficulties would eaſily vaniſh.

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I conclude with offering to the People of England an important conſideration. It is her alone, who can give Peace to Europe. It will be neither the Emperor, nor Spain, nor Holland, who will open conferences in order to procure it Theſe Powers depend on the pleaſure of Great-Britain for their further continuance, or forbearance, in the conteſt: their ſubjects have neither the the means of obtaining, nor do they dare to aſk for Peace. Beſides, each of them would only procure it ſeparately, and partially; whereas England, in concluding Peace, would produce a general pacification, as we have ſeen that her declaration of War has filled Europe with carnage. The Engliſh Nation can demand Peace; it can do more; *it can obtain it.* It would be the moſt brilliant epoch of her glory: and, in giving Peace to many unfortunate People, ſhe would greatly add to her own intereſt.

LONDON, *June* 21, 1794.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

IT is poſſible to calculate political probabilities, but it is impoſſible to predict events. It has happened, that thoſe which have immediately ſucceeded this work, have in a great meaſure confirmed the arguments it contains. I beg the Reader to reflect, whether the reaſons alledged would not have been equally good, although the recent victories of the French in Flanders had not given them additional force.